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Restore a cabinet-level economic 
dialogue to institutionalize cooperation 
and drive progress across the many 
facets of the bilateral economic 
agenda. 
The USMCA creates pathways for 
both cooperation and disputes. Focus 
first on strengthening cooperation as 
both a way to address challenges and 
improve regional competitiveness. 
Strengthen regional supply chain 
security by aligning essential industries 
and establishing protocols for 
emergency response. 
Create a regional workforce 
development dialogue. Technology is 
quickly changing the future of work, 
and a coordinated response is required. 
Put sustainable development and 
inclusive growth at the center of the 
bilateral economic agenda. To maintain 
public support for regional integration, 
these shared challenges must be 
adequately represented. 
Support subnational leaders‘ 
involvement in the binational economic 
relationship.
The final section of this paper provides 
a more detailed and complete set of 
recommendations.
The economies of the United States and Mexico are deeply connected. 
The United States is, by far, Mexico’s top trading partner, and Mexico is the 
United States’ second largest partner.1 While cross-border trade volumes 
are massive, it is the depth of manufacturing integration that makes the 
U.S.-Mexico economic partnership unique. A full half of bilateral trade is in 
inputs for production, parts and materials moving back and forth across 
the border as the two nations co-produce everything from automobiles to 
beer.2 Economic and productive integration, which has been fostered by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and now the United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), has synced the U.S. and Mexican 
economies, which now tend to experience cycles of growth and recession 
together. Deeper still, our competitiveness is linked. Through manufacturing 
integration, the United States and Mexico can divide production in ways that 
take advantage of their competitive advantages, strengthening the region. 
In this way, the economic interests of Mexico and the United States have 
become closely aligned. Productivity enhancements on one side of the 
border strengthen the competitiveness of the region as a whole, and 
despite the fact that there are cases in which an investment won on one 
side of the border means an investment lost on the other, research shows 
that it is more common for companies to simultaneously create jobs on 
both sides of the border as they expand their investment in the regional 
economy.3 In the United States, some five million jobs depend on trade with 
Mexico, and a similarly large number of jobs in Mexico depend on trade 
with the United States.4
The ratification and implementation of the USMCA updated and restored 
certainty to the system of regional trade and production, and the conclusion 
of the renegotiation process opened space for the development of a new 
bilateral (and with Canada, a trilateral) agenda for economic cooperation. 
The USMCA was passed with broad support from representatives of every 
major political party in the U.S. and Mexico, providing a stable platform for 
the future of bilateral economic relations.
As the United States and Mexico each seek to stimulate recovery 
domestically and prepare for economic transformation, they need to keep 
in mind that the depth of North American integration makes job creation 
and export growth largely regional enterprises. This short paper will explore 
these challenges, examine the impact of changes to the regional economic 
framework through the USMCA, and propose a series of measures the 
United States and Mexico can take together in the coming years to 
strengthen the regional economy. 
A Challenging and Quickly Evolving Economic Outlook
The U.S. and Mexican economies, like others around the world, face 
huge challenges as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.S. GDP for 
2020 declined 4.3% and the IMF has forecast a much steeper 9% drop for 
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in each country, increase internal inequality, and, because 
of the difference in the magnitude of recession expected 
in each country, only serve to widen the development gap. 
Reactivating the regional economy and recovering from the 
recession will be the principal economic challenges facing 
both the United States and Mexico for the next several 
years.
Many possible options, such as fiscal stimulus and monetary 
policy, are essentially domestic in nature, but there are 
important matters of shared concern and even opportunity. 
Both governments ordered the temporary closure of 
activities not deemed “essential,” but a lack of cross-
border coordination, initially caused disruptions even to 
critical industries such as medical device manufacturing. 
In contrast, the U.S. and Mexican governments worked 
closely together and jointly announced restrictions on non-
essential travel across the border. With border towns and 
cities suffering from the resulting economic slowdown, they 
will need to coordinate just as closely to find ways to safely 
reopen the border. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, many companies 
are reevaluating their global production networks and 
prioritizing supply chain security and resilience as a result 
of U.S.-China trade tensions and the pandemic. This offers 
North America a tremendous opportunity to reshore 
investment to the region, but it is an opportunity that could 
be missed if the right policies and programs are not in place 
to attract and welcome that investment.
Though accelerated by the pandemic, digital transformation 
and automation have been roiling labor markets and rapidly 
changing demand for skills for many years. Many workers, 
especially in manufacturing and energy industries, but 
increasingly in office jobs, have been left behind as the 
economy evolves before them. The U.S. and Mexico must 
find ways to support major improvements to our workforce 
and skills development systems in order to maximize 
regional competitiveness and ensure that all workers have a 
place in the 21st Century North American economy.
Similarly, the demand for climate change action is more 
urgent than ever. The response to this challenge is 
especially important in the energy sector, and the U.S.-
Mexico Forum has a working group that has put together a 
comprehensive strategy on sustainable development and 
energy systems. Economic development and environmental 
protection, including both climate change mitigation and 
adaptation, cannot be divorced. 
In the border region, the importance of addressing issues 
of water scarcity became abundantly clear this year when 
social unrest erupted in Chihuahua at the Boquilla Dam 
as Mexico struggled to meet its water transfer obligations 
under the binational water treaty. Ultimately, cooperation 
prevailed but the challenges of resource scarcity will only 
grow. Border region leaders will need to work together to 
design and implement strategies that meet the economic 
and environmental needs of their communities.
There is a huge potential for this type of cooperative 
5. David Autor, David Dorn, Gordon Hanson, “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States,” National Bureau of Economic 
Research Working Paper 18054, Cambridge, MA: NBER, May 2012, pp. 20-21, http:// www.nber.org/papers/w18054.
cross-border economic development in the border region. 
Well over a billion dollars in commerce crosses the border 
each day, and the GDP of the six Mexican and four U.S. 
border states is larger than the GDP of all but the three 
largest countries in the world. To take full advantage of 
this opportunity, the U.S. and Mexican governments need 
to facilitate and support greater cross-border cooperation 
among state and local officials in the region. Initiatives like 
the Border Governors Conference, which has not met for 
several years, and the Border Mayors Association need 
robust support.
Fueled by growing gaps in income inequality, populism, 
and economic nationalism have grown around the world 
in recent years making regional and global cooperation 
more difficult to pursue. In Mexico, this is evidenced by the 
significant productivity gap between globally connected 
manufacturing and the rest of the economy. Persistent 
underinvestment in the poorer south, limited development 
of homegrown startups, and an insufficient focus on 
expanding the domestic supplier base for manufacturing 
exporters have each contributed to the challenge. In the 
United States, the decline of manufacturing employment 
over the past several decades has contributed significantly 
to the rise of economic nationalism. Productivity enhancing 
technology and the globalization of production, in particular 
the insertion of China into global value chains, has increased 
the pressure on low- to middle-skilled manufacturing 
workers.5 In both countries, domestic policy issues such 
as taxation, education and workforce development, and 
health are among the most important tools to address 
problems related to income distribution, and North 
American cooperation can play an important role in creating 
opportunities for and protecting workers across the region.
Despite the prominence of trade skepticism heard in 
both countries, the reality of the U.S.-Mexico economic 
relationship is that we are stronger together. The deep 
integration of the manufacturing and other productive 
networks across the U.S.-Mexico border binds our economic 
futures. Our region faces big challenges caused by the 
coronavirus pandemic as well as deeper structural shifts. In 
such challenging times it is easy to look inward and prioritize 
domestic issues, but to do so would be a mistake, for both 
countries. We must instead work together and embrace the 
complementarities of our economies in order to strengthen 
our global competitiveness and build a 21st Century 
economy that works for everyone in each of our countries.
Trade, Supply Chains, and Work under the 
New USMCA
The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), 
effective since July 1, 2020, ended the uncertainty triggered 
by the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the threat of its elimination. The 
USMCA provides continuity with NAFTA on many fronts and 
provides governments and market actors in North America 
with a framework where they can operate with certainty. 
... the reality of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship is that we are 
stronger together.“
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Estimates for USMCA’s growth impact on the U.S. economy 
are very small. The U.S. International Trade Commission 
estimated them around GDP 0.35% or $68.2 billion in the first 
six years. Although the Mexican government has referred to 
it as an important element of its overall economic strategy, 
there haven’t been similar estimates of the economic impact 
of USMCA. The low estimates reinforce the importance 
of holding realistic expectations about USMCA’s potential 
in regard to economic growth. It also makes clear that 
USMCA will not on its own solve the issues of economic 
growth. Governments need to build on the structure 
already constructed under NAFTA and further enhance and 
“technologize” the private sector networks and the cross-
border infrastructure and processing to stimulate growth.
USMCA came into an environment significantly different 
from the free trade optimism that ushered in NAFTA twenty-
five years before. Concerns about the effects of trade, the 
deepening asymmetries between capital and labor, and 
increasing economic inequality have fueled much of the 
discontent against free trade agreements of the last three 
decades in both poor and rich countries alike.6 The U.S. 
took an aggressive oppositional stance toward “globalist” 
trade policy, withdrawing from TPP, starting a tariff war with 
China, renegotiating NAFTA and several bilateral trade 
agreements, and using national security tariffs against 
trading partners. And while these changes were executed 
under the Trump Administration, both Hillary Clinton and 
Bernie Sanders vowed to withdraw from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) and renegotiate NAFTA if they had been 
elected. The trade and investment agenda of the Biden 
campaign — and of the incoming Biden administration — 
make clear that many changes in U.S. policy are here to 
stay. There will be continued attention to job creation in the 
U.S., to the well-being of American workers, to discouraging 
offshoring and investment abroad, and to encouraging 
onshoring and investment at home. 
NAFTA achieved an unprecedented economic integration 
in North America, but its overall welfare effects fell far short 
of what was expected. While flows of trade and investment 
increased dramatically between the U.S. and Mexico, their 
effect on growth was disappointing. During 1994-2016, 
Mexico’s GDP per capita grew only 1.2% on average per year, 
among the lowest in Latin America.7 Mexico’s wages lagged 
behind productivity, even in the successful, export-oriented 
manufacturing firms.8 In fact, the apparent paradox between 
Mexico’s liberalization program heralded by NAFTA and its 
underwhelming, domestic overall economic effects should 
serve as warning about the connection between trade and 
growth.9 Instead of convergence with the U.S., Mexico has 
experienced further divergence where it matters most. 
Mexico’s GDP per capita is no higher relative to the U.S. than 
it was in the years preceding NAFTA and labor productivity 
is farther behind relative to the United States’ than in the 
pre-NAFTA years.10 While not all of the Mexican economy’s 
virtues or ills can be pinned on NAFTA, it is clear that NAFTA 
reshaped the Mexican economy and that subsequent 
6. See, e.g., WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION (Álvaro Santos, David Trubek and Chantal 
Thomas eds., Anthem Press 2019).
7. “Did NAFTA Help Mexico? An Update After 23 Years” Mark Weisbrot et al. Center for Economic and Policy Research (March 2017) https://www.cepr.net/images/stories/
reports/nafta-mexico-update-2017-03.pdf?v=2
8. Robert A. Blecker, Juan Carlos Moreno-Brid and Isabel Salat, “La Renegociación del TLCAN: La Agenda Clave
Que Quedó Pendiente” in La Reestructuración de Norteamérica a Través del Libre Comercio: Del TLCAN al TMEC (Oscar F. Contreras, Gustavo Vega Cánovas y Clemente Ruiz 
Durán eds. 2020).
9. See Dani Rodrik, “Mexico’s Growth Problem”, Project Syndicate, Nov. 13, 2014 https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mexico-growth-problem-by-dani-
rodrik-2014-11. See also See Nancy Birdsall, Dani Rodrik & Arvind Subramanian, How to Help Poor Countries, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2005, at 138.
10. Robert. A. Blecker, “Integration, Productivity, and Inclusion in Mexico: A Macro Perspective”, in Innovation and Inclusion in Latin America: Strategies to Avoid the Middle 
Income Trap (Alejandro Foxley and Barbara Stallings eds. 2016) pp. 175- 204.
11. Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Exec. Office of the President, Agreement between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada 05/30/19 Text (2018) 
[hereinafter USMCA]. Ch. 4, app. to annex 4-B, Product-Specific Rules of Origin for Automotive Goods, art. 3.
12. Id. art. 4-B.7.
13. Id. arts. 4-B.3.7. and 4-B.6.
14. Enrique Dussel Peters, Efectos del TPP en la Economía de México: Impacto General y en las Cadenas de Calor de Autopartes-Automotriz, Hilo-Textil-Confección y Calzado, 
Cuaderno de Investigación TPP-04, Senado de la República, 2017,p.24 https://dusselpeters.com/115.pdf
Mexican governments were not able to advance policies 
that capitalized on the opportunities or tempered the 
resulting asymmetries. 
The new USMCA and the changes in U.S. policy will no 
doubt bring challenges but also offer an opportunity to 
focus on the distributional consequences of trade and 
investment, which had been largely ignored, and on the 
overall effects for the economy. For Mexico, this will offer 
an opportunity to devise its own development strategy 
without expecting USMCA to deliver it. If NAFTA offers one 
clear lesson, it is that increasing (and now maintaining) trade 
and investment flows is not a growth strategy. USMCA will 
allow both countries to focus on domestic economic policy 
while maintaining the potential benefits of a high degree of 
regional integration. For now, changes in USMCA on rules 
of origin, investment and labor may portend a new direction 
in U.S. policy for future trade agreements. Even if, for now, 
USMCA preserved much of NAFTA, it may continue to 
change as a result of future review cycles, now embedded 
in the operation of USMCA by design. Below, we discuss the 
most relevant changes USMCA has introduced.
1. Rules of Origin (ROO)
It is important to note that rules of origin in most sectors, 
such as electronics and textiles, were maintained. This 
ensures the continuity of most regional value chains 
undisturbed. The most notable change came in the 
automobile industry. Here, three aspects are noteworthy: 
 y The regional value content (RVC) requirement increased 
from 62.5% to 75%, which means that the percentage of 
non-regional content allowed dropped by 33.3%.11  
 y A labor value content (LVC) requirement was that 40% of 
the value of the car is manufactured with wages of at least 
$16 dollars per hour.12 
 y Certain automobile parts and components must be wholly 
produced in the region and 70% of aluminum and steel 
content should originate in the region.13 
The rules of origin for autos and auto parts agreed upon 
in USMCA stand in stark contrast with those that had 
been negotiated in TPP, which were considerably lower 
than in NAFTA. This provides some relief to Mexican car 
manufacturers in terms of the anticipated competition 
with other TPP countries in the U.S. market. However, the 
higher USMCA content requirement also presents important 
challenges, given that an important share of inputs in 
Mexican production come from outside North America.14 
An important question going forward is whether U.S. and 
Mexican auto makers will be able to meet the higher 
USMCA content requirement.
The new 75% regional value content aims to incentivize 
greater production in North America and away from 
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other global value chains, notably from Asia. This may 
present an opportunity for Mexico, if Mexican auto parts 
suppliers expand the range of their production to include 
additional inputs currently imported from outside the 
region. Alternatively, global auto parts suppliers could move 
production to Mexico so that their parts could be counted as 
North American. Analysts estimate that 68% of production in 
Mexico already meets the new content requirements.15 An 
open question is whether those firms who don’t meet these 
requirements would adjust their production or opt out of 
USMCA and abide by the U.S. most-favored-nation (MFN) 
tariff, which for autos is 2.5%.
The new 40% labor value content seeks to ensure that 
the United States benefits from a significant part of the 
production increase. Of this 40%, 15% can relate to research 
and development, and information technology jobs, while 
25% must relate to manufacturing costs. In Mexico, the 
average wage rate in auto assembly ranges between $5 
and $7 per hour,16 while engineering and research and 
development jobs already meet or are close to the $16 
per hour requirement. This means that it will be practically 
impossible for auto companies in Mexico to meet the $16 
wage requirement in 25% of their production content, which 
would have to come from the U.S. or Canada. 
Analyses of the effects of the new ROO raise concerns 
about possible increase in car prices, as cheaper parts from 
other supply chains are substituted for more expensive 
North American ones. A rise in consumer prices could 
reduce demand and in turn lead to a production drop and 
potential job losses.17
2. Labor Rights and Labor Panels 
The USMCA had three important features concerning labor 
rights. First, the labor chapter included new state obligations 
such as prevention of violence against workers, prohibition 
on gender discrimination, and protection of migrant workers. 
It also included an explicit recognition of the right to strike as 
a component of the right to freedom of association. 
Second, the labor chapter’s Annex includes a commitment 
by Mexico to reform its labor laws and institutions. Mexico 
adopted its new law on May 1, 2019 and is now in the 
implementation phase. The reform i) establishes a new 
dispute settlement system under the jurisdiction of Mexican 
courts and eliminates the administrative labor conciliation 
and arbitration boards, ii) creates an autonomous center for 
labor conciliation and registration, which will register unions 
and collective agreements, taking that function away from 
the government, and iii) entrusts that center with verifying 
that elections — deciding union leadership and majority 
support of collective agreements — are personal, free, 
direct and secret.
15. USMCA: Motor Vehicle Provisions and Issues, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 19, 2019. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11387
16. “Only 269,000 Mexicans earn more than US $16 per hour, or 308 pesos” Mexico News Daily, Aug. 30, 2018.
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/only-269000-mexicans-earn-more-than-16-per-hour
17. See e.g. USMCA: Motor Vehicle Provisions and Issues, Congressional Research Service, Dec. 19, 2019. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11387
18. Graciela Bensusán, Empleos en México bajo presión: con o sin TLCAN, en LA REESTRUCTURACIÓN DE NORTEAMÉRICA A TRAVÉS DEL LIBRE COMERCIO: DEL TLCAN AL 
TMEC (Oscar F. Contreras, Gustavo Vega Cánovas y Clemente Ruiz Durán.
Finally, the Protocol of Amendment created a new 
expedited enforcement mechanism called the Rapid 
Response Panels. This mechanism allows for review and 
remediation of a denial of rights in a relatively short process 
(120 days). The panelists may verify whether a violation 
exists by visiting the facility in question. When a violation is 
confirmed and goes unredressed, the complainant country 
may impose sanctions on the goods produced in violation 
of the agreement, including higher tariffs, fines, or denying 
entry. 
The changes introduced by USMCA will require 
important adjustments in Mexico. If the federal labor 
law is implemented effectively, workers would be able 
to associate, form independent unions and bargain 
collectively, in a way they have not been able to do for 
decades. It could mean the end of widespread simulation 
in the form of “protection contracts” between corrupt 
union leaders and firms, where workers didn’t choose 
their union or even know they belong to one. It would 
also mean the end of government intervention in union 
governance, intimidation or outright violence in voting for 
crucial decisions, and a biased dispute settlement system. 
A striking feature in the Mexican economy is that wages 
declined not only in those firms that fell behind or in sectors 
that failed to integrate, but also in the most successful, 
export-oriented firms, which were highly integrated in 
the North American market, where wages fell behind 
productivity.18 The labor reform could gradually result in 
better wages for Mexican workers. Higher wages could 
incentivize employers in various export sectors to rely 
less on cheap labor as their main competitive advantage 
and instead seek to add value in the production chain, 
innovating in their products, process of production or 
business strategies. Workers with greater incomes would 
also stimulate domestic demand. It is early to tell but signals 
so far seem to indicate that while at the federal level the 
reform is proceeding as planned, at the state level there 
may be more hurdles and less political will.
Statements from the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) and the American Federation of Labor and Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) indicating that they 
expect to use the rapid response panels against Mexico 
suggest that the mechanism will be tested in the near 
future. As the experience of the World Trade Organization 
has made clear, an excessive focus on dispute settlement 
and strategic litigation could hamstring attempts to address 
systemic problems. Adjudication could solve specific cases, 
and it needs to be effective, but it is only one tool among 
others in making sure commitments are enforced on both 
sides. 
Changes in USCMA labor rights was good news for 
U.S. workers for at least two reasons. First, because it 
incorporated the American labor movement concerns about 
Changes in USCMA labor rights was good news for U.S. workers ...“
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social dumping, and it lended legitimacy to their concerns 
about the distributional effects of trade. And second, 
because it showed that the concerns of American workers’ 
organizations can be included, rather than excluded, in 
trade negotiations and policy. 
3. Changed Investment Regime and Reduction of Investor 
Rights 
USMCA introduced important changes in the investor-state 
dispute settlement system (ISDS). The scope of investors’ 
rights was reduced to a “skinny” ISDS, which preserves 
protection from direct expropriation and discriminatory 
treatment but eliminates other rights under NAFTA. A new 
requirement was that local remedies be exhausted before 
investors can resort to arbitration. However, investors with a 
“covered government contract” in specific sectors including 
oil and natural gas, power generation, telecommunication, 
transportation, and infrastructure enjoy the full panoply 
of rights and can resort to arbitration without going first to 
national courts.
The reduction of rights responds to increasing concerns 
about the investor-State dispute settlement system (ISDS) 
in both developed and developing countries.19 The USMCA 
may indicate a new direction in trade agreements regarding 
ISDS. The benefit for U.S. and Mexico is the avoidance of 
regulatory chill for fear of potential investor claims in areas of 
public interest such as health and the environment, and the 
prevention of costly liability and litigation costs for legitimate 
regulation.
4. Digital Trade 
USMCA liberalized the cross-border movement of data, 
making the importation and exportation of digital products 
duty free. It recognized the importance of measures to 
protect consumers from fraudulent practices and protect 
individual personal data. Furthermore, it outlawed data 
localization requirements that made the establishment of 
physical computing facilities a condition of doing business in 
that country.
But there are two sources of tension. First, USMCA prevents 
parties from assigning liability to internet service providers 
for content placed on their platforms by third parties. Given 
mounting concerns about fake news and disinformation 
campaigns in social media platforms, we may see stricter 
regulation in the U.S and the need to revise the USMCA 
on this front. A second area of potential tension concerns 
mechanisms for taxation of digital sales, which are allowed 
under the USMCA as long as they are otherwise consistent 
with the agreement. An important question is whether there 
could be an evolving consensus on acceptable taxing 
practices for digital companies, or if these would be ad hoc 
understandings of different countries with the U.S., since 
most of the affected global digital companies are American. 
This may be a subject worth addressing in the context of the 
USMCA Trade Commission.
Digital trade may offer an opportunity for small and medium-
size companies in Mexico to participate in regional trade 
as service providers, in areas like cloud storage, fintech, or 
software development.
5. Review Mechanism
While the U.S. original proposal for a five-year sunset clause 
did not make it to the final text, USMCA is effective for a 
renewable sixteen-year term (Article 34.7). On year six of the 
Agreement (2026), the Free Trade Commission will meet to 
conduct a “joint review” and the Parties may confirm they 
19. See e.g. Robert Howse, International Investment Law and Arbitration: A Conceptual Framework in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION (H.R. Fabri ed., 2017).
https://www.iilj.org/publications/international-investment-law-arbitration-conceptual-framework/
want to renew the Agreement for another sixteen-year 
term. If a party does not renew the Agreement on year six, 
the Commission will meet and conduct a review every 
year during the subsequent ten years, in which the parties 
may confirm at any point their desire to renew it for another 
sixteen-year term.
This term-specific feature of USMCA may create uncertainty 
about the long-term continuation of the Agreement 
and reduce incentives to invest in large-scale projects 
that require big, upfront expenditures with expected 
returns spanning many years. However, unlike NAFTA, 
this mechanism provides an opportunity to evaluate the 
operation and effects of the Agreement and to update 
or amend it accordingly. By institutionalizing the review 
process parties may be able to clarify interpretations when 
there is doubt and to correct course if something is not 
operating as expected. 
How the U.S. and Mexico Can Work 
Together to Take Advantage of this New 
Framework
1. Work Together to Attract Auto Investment to the 
Region
The biggest challenge for the industry is the possibility of 
increasing production costs, which would result in higher 
car prices, reducing consumer demand in North America 
and competitiveness in export markets. Recently, the U.S. 
and Mexico adopted alternative staging regime transition 
periods to provide more flexibility for companies aiming to 
comply with the new rules. Both countries could use the 
information received in companies’ applications to assess 
the rules’ potential impact and fine-tune the strategy. This 
could help governments minimize the potential negative 
effects of the requirements, and consider longer transition 
periods and possible exceptions. Evaluating the impact 
of these rules of origin should be a priority in the review 
process six years in. 
2. A Coordinated China Strategy—Attracting Investment, 
Managing Risks, Expanding Exports
The Transformation of Global Value Chains: We can 
expect to see the continuation of a significant transformation 
in global value chains (GVC). The competitive race in the 
digital economy and its telecom infrastructure will continue 
to shape GVC and be a source of tension between the 
U.S. and China. At the same time, the general U.S.-China 
tensions, exemplified by the trade war, and the COVID-19 
pandemic could make near-shoring increasingly relevant for 
the U.S. and North America. 
Mexico in the Context of U.S.-China Tensions: In USMCA, 
Mexico committed to continue and to deepen its economic 
integration with North America. On the other hand, Mexico 
has an important trade relationship with China (its second 
trading partner after the U.S.). Ideally, Mexico should 
maintain both a deep and long-term relationship with the 
U.S. and independent space to engage with China. USMCA 
Article 32.10 provides that if a party enters into a free trade 
agreement with a non-market economy, namely China, the 
other parties may terminate the USMCA and replace it with a 
bilateral agreement between them. This is another example 
of how the growing U.S.-China tensions are influencing trade 
agreements. However, Mexico should be able to continue 
to develop its trade and investment relationship with China, 
without the need of a formal free trade agreement. 
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Mexico has seen a temporary benefit in its trade relationship 
with the U.S., becoming the latter’s first trading partner as a 
result of the tensions with China. Mexico’s potential benefit 
from the current tariff war would depend on China’s share 
in U.S. imports. There are ten sectors where Mexico could 
benefit, including electronics, auto parts, automobiles, 
footwear, and apparel, among others (Dussel). However, 
the trade gains for Mexico in terms of greater imports to 
the U.S. so far have been minimal and FDI from the U.S. (or 
China) has not increased. Taking advantage of this potential 
opportunity would require a deliberate strategy from the 
Mexican government and a coordinated strategy with the 
private sector not seen yet. If the U.S. tariffs continue, there’s 
also the potential of Chinese investment in Mexico in some 
of these areas entering the U.S. market bypassing U.S. tariffs. 
Again, whether this investment materializes, in the auto 
sector or elsewhere, may depend not only on the incentives 
that the new U.S. tariffs create for Chinese companies, but 
on a deliberate strategy by the Mexican government.
Opportunities for Reshoring in North America and Greater 
Integration with the U.S.: It is possible, though not certain, 
that the Biden Administration will de-escalate the current 
tariff war with China, which has in fact increased the U.S. 
trade deficit. If the U.S. were to remove tariffs, it is unclear 
when this would happen and in what sectors. What is 
more certain is that the Biden Administration will launch a 
“Supply America” plan to on-shore critical supply chains to 
the U.S. and reduce dependence on China. This is part of a 
broader plan on manufacturing and innovation, including 
significant investments in research and development. The 
program seeks to strengthen domestic supply chains on 
medical goods and equipment but goes beyond health 
emergencies to include “energy and grid resilience 
technologies, semiconductors, key electronics and related 
technologies, telecommunications infrastructure, and key 
raw materials.”20 There will be a government-wide process, 
in collaboration with the private sector, to monitor and 
review vulnerabilities and address them as technology and 
markets evolve.
A shift away from manufacturing dependency on China, 
already visible in the auto sector in USMCA, can represent 
an opportunity for North American supply chains, and for 
Mexico specifically, to take on some of that production. 
Particularly if Mexico effectively implements its labor reform 
and its manufacturing exports can no longer be perceived 
as “social dumping”, Mexico’s proximity to the U.S., reliance 
on a robust supply-chain infrastructure, qualified workforce 
in manufacturing, and competitive labor costs could make it 
attractive as a second-best to on-shoring, when producing 
in the U.S. would make prices non-competitive. 
3. Use Competitiveness Committee to Institutionalize 
Further Trilateral Cooperation
Established by USMCA Chapter 25, the North American 
Competitiveness Committee is composed by government 
representatives of the three Parties and is scheduled to 
meet annually. The committee’s mandate is broad, aiming 
to “support a competitive environment” that promotes trade 
and investment, but also regional economic integration 
20. https://joebiden.com/supplychains/
21. See e.g. “Economic Impacts of Wait Times at the San Diego–Baja California Border,” San Diego Association of Governments, California Department of Transportation, District 
11, January 19, 2006.
and development. It seeks to broaden the base of those 
who benefit from regional trade, assisting traders in each 
party to identify further opportunities but also increase 
the “participation of SMEs, and enterprises owned by 
under-represented groups including women, indigenous 
peoples, youth, and minorities.” It also seeks to propose 
policies to develop a modern physical and digital trade and 
investment infrastructure, as well as to foster cooperation on 
technology and innovation. 
As with any committee, it will be as good as the Parties 
make it out to be. This could be a useful institutional 
mechanism, which already foresees the engagement 
with “interested persons” who can provide input. The U.S., 
Mexico, and Canada could use this committee to provide a 
wide forum among the three nations, engaging the private 
sector, labor, and civil society to receive important feedback 
and ensure continued support for the Agreement. This will 
not happen on its own and there may be inertia or even 
resistance, so there will need to be a deliberate effort to 
advance it and make the committee a relevant forum for the 
governments and for civil society. 
USMCA creates multiple committees, all under the purview 
of supervision of the Free Trade Commission (Ch. 30). While 
some of the committees pertain to specific trade areas 
(i.e. agriculture, intellectual property, financial services, 
etc.), others are more general and cut across sectors. For 
instance, in addition to the Competitiveness Committee, 
there’s the Committee on SME Issues (Ch. 25), which is also 
comprised of government representatives and scheduled to 
meet annually. It foresees a trilateral dialogue on SMEs with 
non-governmental actors. These more general committees 
provide a space and a mechanism but don’t have ready-
made stakeholders. To ensure the effectiveness of the 
USMCA institutional architecture, it will be important to 
clarify the relationship between the different committees 
and use these mechanisms to foster trilateral cooperation 
on priorities. 
4. Trade Facilitation and Cross-Border Infrastructure
There are 55 points of entry along the U.S.-Mexico border, 
which process more than 80% of bilateral trade. With over 
one million people and 447,000 vehicles crossing every 
day, it is the most frequently crossed border in the world. 
The U.S. and Mexico have an opportunity to streamline their 
trade, implementing the new obligations under the USMCA 
Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation chapter. In 
addition, they should invest in infrastructure, both physical 
and digital, to reduce wait times at the border that result in 
billions of dollars lost.21 Upgrading the ports of entry to build 
a smart and efficient border that reflects the dynamic trade 
flows of the two countries could be a low-hanging fruit 
where investment would yield important returns for both 
countries.
There are ten sectors where Mexico could benefit, including electronics, 
auto parts, automobiles, footwear, and apparel ...“
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Beyond USMCA: An Agenda for Economic 
Cooperation
As discussed above, the USMCA plays a critical role in 
guaranteeing the future of North American trade and 
manufacturing integration. It offers opportunities to attract 
investments to the region and to effectively manage 
conflict in sensitive sectors. Nonetheless, it is not on its 
own an economic growth strategy or a sufficient bilateral 
economic agenda. In fact, the intensity of the NAFTA 
renegotiations over the past several years took so much 
policymaker attention that other parts of the U.S.-Mexico 
economic agenda lost steam. The High Level Economic 
Dialogue (HLED), which coordinated this broader agenda, 
did not survive the transition to the Trump Administration 
in Washington, D.C., and the launching of the USMCA 
negotiations. Now, with the USMCA passed and 
implemented, it is time to create a new mechanism to 
institutionalize and manage economic cooperation. To 
be successful, however, this cannot simply be an exercise 
in recreating the past. We must build institutions that are 
capable of responding to the pressing economic challenges 
of today and the opportunities on the horizon.
The new economic dialogue could be bilateral or trilateral 
and North American in nature. In either configuration, three 
components are needed to ensure its success. First is 
leadership. The mechanism needs to be driven by cabinet-
level leaders that have the vision and energy to push 
through bureaucratic bottlenecks and create meaningful 
results that improve the lives of people on both sides of 
the border. Second, a series of binational working groups 
and councils need to be created to help design and then 
drive progress on the agenda during the periods between 
cabinet-level meetings. These groups need representation 
from the wide range of agencies that must coordinate 
efforts. Third, and importantly, robust mechanisms need 
to be created to involve stakeholders and subnational 
governments in the dialogue. The USMXECO CEO Dialogue 
played an important role in generating ideas and helping 
support initiatives of the HLED. Strong private sector 
participation will again be very important, but outreach 
needs to be stronger with civil society, labor, border 
communities, and subnational governments both in the 
border region and beyond. The importance of involving 
border communities and subnational governments 
from across both countries in the development and 
implementation of U.S.-Mexico economic cooperation 
cannot be overemphasized. 
The first task is to construct the agenda. It must be 
ambitious and respond to the economic needs of average 
people across the region. It needs to include elements 
that the presidents could talk about in the Rose Garden or 
National Palace. High profile issues such as job creation, 
reducing inequality, and the climate crisis should be the 
drivers of more specific and discrete tasks like improving 
trade infrastructure, aligning regulation, or expanding 
educational and research partnerships.
The first component of any updated U.S.-Mexico economic 
agenda must be to respond to the challenges (and 
opportunities) presented by the COVID-19 pandemic and 
related recession. The integration of cross-border supply 
chains has created a deep level of interdependence 
between the United States and Mexico; we supply one 
another with medical devices that keep us safe during this 
time, with vital food products, and with parts and materials 
that allow factories on the other side of the border to keep 
running. As such, the United States and Mexico must 
create mechanisms to ensure that any future emergency 
measures that impact production or logistics capacity be 
at a minimum communicated and ideally coordinated with 
officials on the other side of the border. To the extent that 
the governments of North America can align their definitions 
of essential industries, they can increase their likelihood of 
attracting investment from companies looking to strengthen 
their supply chain security and resilience. Already, as a 
result of pandemic-related supply chain disruptions and 
increasing trade tensions between the United States and 
China, companies are seeking to shorten and improve 
reliability along their supply chains. The United States 
remains the most attractive consumer market in the world, 
so these dynamics create a strong incentive for greater use 
of the North American production platform. To the extent 
that the governments of North America can ensure investors 
that they have developed systems to minimize disruption 
during future crises, they will position themselves to take full 
advantage of this trend. 
NAFTA, just like economic globalization more generally, was 
often portrayed by its critics as good for business elites but 
not workers and impoverished communities. The reality may 
be more complicated, but without a doubt the perception 
left NAFTA vulnerable to attack and inherently unstable. 
The strengthening of labor and environmental components 
of NAFTA in the USMCA will help mitigate these attacks 
in the future, but the United States and Mexico need to 
develop a strategy of cooperation for inclusive growth. This 
includes doing more to support greater participation of 
small and medium sized businesses in regional trade. The 
proliferation of e-commerce and ease of express shipping 
make this more realistic than ever, but the prospect of 
finding customers abroad and dealing with the customs 
and logistics issues involved in international shipping 
is still a major barrier. Border communities, which have 
some of the highest rates of poverty in the United States, 
need the support of the U.S. and Mexican governments to 
develop and implement binational economic development 
strategies that see their position on the border, with their 
binational, bilingual, and bicultural populations, as an asset 
to be leveraged for their development. Binational programs 
to support women entrepreneurs, the development of 
innovation ecosystems, and cross-border internships should 
all be updated and revitalized. 
The most important thing that can be done to promote 
inclusive growth in the regional economy is an overhaul 
of worker training systems. Rapid technological change, 
more than anything else, has changed the labor market 
THE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONS IN 
U.S.-MEXICO RELATIONS
The United States and Mexico have an exceedingly 
complex and broad relationship, encompassing 
not only traditional issues of foreign policy but 
also domestic matters such as the construction of 
city roads to facilitate access to border crossings. 
Achieving progress often requires the coordination 
of actions from local, state, and federal actors from 
across numerous agencies in both countries. Driving 
coordination and overcoming bureaucratic obstacles 
requires leadership from the highest levels, but also 
working groups with the technical capacity to solve 
problems. Institutions like the High Level Economic 
Dialogue create synergy between these two levels, 
with leaders providing the impetus to break through 
bottlenecks and the working groups both identifying 
important projects and providing the follow through 
so that leaders feel their continued engagement is 
productive.
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landscape, bringing new value to higher education 
and technical skills related to the management of new, 
productivity-enhancing technologies. At the same time, 
workers without those skills or education have seen their 
opportunities diminish. Trade Adjustment Assistance has 
played an important role in supporting workers who lost 
their jobs due to increased import competition, but a much 
larger, more comprehensive, and updated approach is 
needed to address the simultaneous pressure put on many 
workers from automation, robotics, and global competition. 
Certainly, at its core, education and workforce development 
is a domestic challenge for both the United States and 
Mexico, but there are important ways in which, given 
their economic integration, the two can also collaborate. 
Tony Wayne and Sergio Alcocer have put forth a series of 
recommendations for a regional workforce development 
dialogue at the bilateral or trilateral level. They include the 
following:22
 y Expand Apprenticeships and Other Types of Work-Based 
Learning (WBL) and Technical Education, Including 
Internships, Mentorships, and Mid-Career Learning 
 y Address Key Issues Surrounding Credentials, Including 
Recognition and Portability, to Enhance Transparency 
 y Improve Labor Market Data Collection and Transparency, 
Including Moving Towards Accepted Norms for 
Employment, Education, and Skills-Related Data Collected 
and for Making that Data Widely Available  
 y Identify Best Practices to Approach/Prepare for “The 
Fourth Industrial Revolution,” the Transformative Arrival of 
New Technologies and the Future of Work
We wholly endorse their recommendations and believe 
workforce development to be a particularly timely addition 
to the bilateral agenda for three reasons. First, the Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador Administration has already made 
the issue a priority, establishing a major youth internship 
program, Jóvenes Construyendo el Futuro (Youth Building 
the Future). Adding a binational component supporting 
young Mexicans and Americans taking internships across 
the border would be a natural fit and important way to build 
an interculturally competent North American workforce. 
Second, due to the decentralized nature of higher education 
in especially the United States but also Mexico, workforce 
development is a great topic for the type of state and local 
engagement in bilateral relations that we recommend. 
Finally, this topic puts the worker first, contributing to a 
more inclusive approach to bilateral economic relations. Of 
course, it also improves regional competitiveness, but in a 
way that stands in contrast to the perceptions of an elite-
focused approach to globalization and regional integration. 
For a very similar set of reasons to those outlined above, 
the United States and Mexico should focus on expanding 
opportunities for binational research and educational 
partnerships. In 2014, the U.S. and Mexico launched 
FOBESI, the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Forum on Higher 
Education, Innovation and Research, which was designed 
to complement and focus existing U.S. and Mexican 
efforts to expand student and research exchange more 
broadly.23 Supporters of the initiative in government and 
academic institutions found that short-term (a semester or 
less) exchange programs had the most promise to attract 
student and professor interest while also expanding the 
opportunities to traditionally underserved populations. 





its inclusion on the agenda for subnational forums for 
cooperation like the Border Governors Conference and 
North American Summit.24 
Technological advance is driving huge changes in the way 
factories and offices around the world do business. Data 
analysis is improving efficiency in production and logistics; 
artificial intelligence systems (often hosted on the cloud) 
are now the first point of contact for many customer service 
and IT departments; and meetings are at least as likely to 
be virtual as they are in person. Digital transformation 
is here today and will continue driving a restructuring of 
work and the economy for years to come. Both the United 
States and Mexico are well positioned to take advantage 
of these trends, but both have major work to do to ensure 
their workforces, infrastructure, and systems of governance 
are ready for the economy of tomorrow. In particular, 
Mexico lags behind other similarly developed nations in 
the state of its digital economy.25 The low proportion of its 
population with a bank account, weak broadband access, 
and unreliable post damper the growth of e-commerce and 
sales of digital services. North America is otherwise primed 
for major growth in regional e-commerce, so a concentrated 
effort to improve these foundations of the digital economy in 
Mexico could go a long way to create export opportunities 
THE KEY ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL 
LEADERS
Increasingly, there are opportunities for governors, 
mayors, and other subnational leaders to engage 
counterparts across the border in ways that produce 
tangible results for their constituencies. Over the 
years, and with some ups and downs, organizations 
like the Border Governors Conference, Border Mayors 
Association, the U.S. National Governors Association, 
and Mexico’s National Governors Conference (Conago) 
have each participated in important cross-border 
initiatives. They have worked to sustainably manage 
water, reduce pollution, increase trade, coordinate 
infrastructure development, and share best practices 
on education and workforce development. 
Because the United States and Mexico have federalist 
systems of government, state and local leaders have 
the power to impact key issues in bilateral relations. In 
fact, though foreign relations are clearly the domain 
of federal governments, state and local participation 
is vital when it comes to things like building 
interconnected road systems and growing student 
exchange (and should be supported by the foreign 
ministries). When managed successfully, state and 
local leadership can even help tackle issues that are 
too politically thorny for the federal governments, such 
as immigration and water management. 
The importance of local participation in bilateral 
relations is especially apparent in border communities, 
where everything from fighting fires to economic 
development has binational components, but mayors 
from throughout both countries can find value in 
leading trade missions or developing university 
partnerships across the border. 
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for small business. Focus is also needed on financing opportunities for entrepreneurs in Mexico, which can in part be improved 
by strengthening links between U.S.-based venture capital and Mexican startups.
Since NAFTA eliminated tariffs for most goods across North America, non-tariff barriers, such as differences in standards 
and regulations ensuring product and food safety now act as some of the largest barriers to trade. Efforts to coordinate the 
creation of compatible regulation across North America will improve regional competitiveness by allowing companies to 
design and manufacture products for sale across the region. The United States has previously engaged both Canada (U.S.-
Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council) and Mexico (U.S.-Mexico High Level Regulatory Cooperation Council) on a bilateral 
basis to harmonize regulation. These efforts should be revitalized and made trilateral. The effort should first prioritize building 
cooperation to write new rules before turning to the more difficult task of adjusting existing regulations to improve compatibility. 
The Biden Administration has an ambitious plan to address climate change, and there are significant opportunities for cross-
border collaboration in this area. The U.S.-Mexico Forum has a separate group that has developed a series of valuable 
recommendations on issues of energy and sustainable development. Here we will just add that efforts on sustainable 
development and energy must be fully integrated into the U.S.-Mexico economic dialogue. The U.S.-Mexico border region 
should be prioritized and developed as an example for the world of what is possible in terms of international cooperation for 
sustainable development. A council led by high level officials from the economic and environmental agencies in both countries 
should be formed with a mandate to create a comprehensive sustainable development strategy for the border region, 
integrating approaches to water management, economic development, energy, and mobility.
Migration and drug policy are traditionally discussed by security officials insofar as they form part of the bilateral agenda, yet 
each has important economic dimensions, and the inclusion of economic officials in the dialogue may open new areas for 
cooperation. In the case of migration, the link is apparent, as the majority of migrants in the region are at least in part seeking 
better work opportunities. U.S.-Mexico and North American cooperation to support economic development in Central America 
could go a long way toward addressing the root causes of emigration from the Northern Triangle, and a regional dialogue 
on the temporary movement of workers may open up spaces for the consideration of legislative action on the issue within 
the United States. Marijuana has historically been bought and sold in the black market, outside of the purview of economic 
regulators, but that dynamic is changing across North America. Canada has legalized recreational marijuana; Mexico is in the 
process of doing so, and despite federal restrictions, several U.S. states have also created legal marijuana markets. While the 
creation of a North American marijuana market will not be possible until U.S. federal law changes, there may be opportunities 
to begin a dialogue to share best practices on regulatory frameworks and a future in which this market includes international 
trade in the region.
Conclusion and Summary Recommendations
The United States and Mexico face an economic outlook that is at once challenging and promising. With the USMCA in 
place and the COVID-19 vaccination rollout underway, two of the largest sources of uncertainty hovering over the regional 
economy are clearing, offering hope that pent up consumption and investment may be on the horizon. Still, COVID-19 has 
left a trail of destruction in its wake — businesses shuttered, evictions pending, and elevated levels of poverty. Political forces 
in both countries make an inward, domestic-first posture quite appealing right now, but to do so at the expense of regional 
cooperation across North America would be a mistake. Only together can North America rise to the challenge of growing 
international competition. Policies to address structural issues in each economy can and should be complementary to regional 
economic collaboration. In so many ways, the United States and Mexico already share a regional economy, and in the wake of 
crisis, they must work together to rebuild an even stronger, more inclusive and more competitive region.
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